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CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR FLORIDA
The increasing magnitude of national consumer losses due to fraud, estimated at $10 billion annually,' has generated widespread public concern.
During 1972, for example, local and state consumer agencies in Florida received almost 100,000 consumer complaints. 2 Although public awareness has
resulted in both governmental and private action, a totally effective deterrent
to consumer fraud has not yet been developed.
Better business bureaus and other non-governmental groups,3 although
successful in resolving relatively minor consumer complaints, lack statutory
enforcement authority. In contrast, those governmental agencies having enforcement authority4 are characteristically allocated limited funds and staff.
Furthermore, governmental agency efforts are often adversely affected by lobbying pressures and the burden of administering diverse and unrelated programs. 5 Small claims courts have deteriorated into little more than "collectors'
courts,"6 with such nominal amounts in controversy that a fraudulent defendant supplier normally remains financially unthreatened.7 Moreover, because of the negligible potential recovery in the typical case of consumer

1. Comment, Class Actions for Consumer Protection, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - Crv. LIB. L.
REv. 601, 602 (1972).
2. See 1 CONSUMER ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNOR, 1 CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORIDA: A REPoRT
TO GOVERNOR REUBIN O'D. ASKEW 29-70, 95 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN
FLORIDA].

3. Better Business Bureaus of South Florida, Inc. claims effective resolution of 50% of
all consumer complaints received. The primary enforcement technique of better business
bureaus is to expel from membership those merchants guilty of unfair trade practices. Id. at
100. For a list of other local nongovernmental agencies in Florida, see id. vol. 2, at 38A-41A.
4. Federal agencies with enforcement authority include the Federal Trade Commission
and the Federal Drug Administration. An executive staff office of consumer affairs has also

been established.
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35-37 (1971). Florida has at least twelve state agencies and six local

agencies possessing some consumer-oriented functions, and state laws governing over thirty
areas of consumer interest. CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 29-30, 81, 118-47.
The primary statute dealing with consumer fraud in Florida is the "Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act," enacted by the 1973 Florida Legislature. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 124, §§1-5,
to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§501.201-.213 (1973). Popularly termed the "Little FTC Act,"
it grants broad power to the state cabinet to promulgate rules that prohibit unfair trade
practices. See text accompanying notes 151-156 infra.
5. See generally Schrag & Meltsner, Class Action: A Way To Beat the Bureaucracies
Without IncreasingThem, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1972, at 55.
6. Seventy-four per cent of all suits in Florida's small claim and county courts during

1972 were brought by businesses and corporations. 3

CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORIDA,

supra

note 2, at 135.
7. See generally Note, Consumer Protection in Florida:Inadequate Legislative Treatment
of Consumer Fraud, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 528, 533 (1971). "Supplier" includes seller, lessor,
assignor, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 124, §1, to be
codified as FLA. STAT. §501.203(3) (1973).
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fraud, individual litigation in a court of general jurisdiction is seldom
economically feasible. 8
Primarily as a result of the inability of governmental and private action to
effectuate a complete remedy for the defrauded consumer, support has grown 9
in recent years for the addition of a new weapon to the anti-consumer fraud
arsenal: the consumer class action. This procedural device enables one consumer to bring suit on behalf of all other consumers defrauded by the same
supplier. This note will trace the development of the consumer class action
and will also discuss the class action experience of Florida and other jurisdictions. Additionally, a proposal designed to establish the right of defrauded
Florida consumers to bring class actions in state courts will be offered.1 0
DEVELOPAMENT OF THE CONSUMER CLAss ACrION

HistoricalDevelopment
Developed originally in 17th century England as an exception to compulsory joinder," the class action enabled litigation to be maintained when
the bringing of all interested parties before the court was impossible or impracticable. 12 The common law permitted class suits only in equity, 3 and
required that the parties be too numerous to join and that the class be bound
by a common interest. 4 The few states lacking class action rules or statutes
continue to apply these common law criteria. 5
The earliest codification of a class action rule in the United States was the
1849 amendment to New York's Field Code of 1848.16 Following the common
law, the amendment served as the model for most class action rules and stat-

8. Most disputes between merchants and individual consumers involve less than $300.
Deans, Class-Action Lawsuits, 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 3, 4 (No. 1, 1973).
9. See, e.g., Ashe, The Class Action: Solution for the Seventies, 7 NEW ENGLAND L. REv.
1 (1971); Schrag & Meltsner, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Fohrmann, The Environmental Lawsuit: TraditionalDoctrines and Evolving
Theories To Control Pollution, 1971 ENVIRONMENTAL L. Ray. 199; Note, Class Actions Under
the Truth-in-Lending Act, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1305 (1972), for a discussion of related
topics.
11. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLum. L. Rav. 609, 611

(1971).
12. 3b J. MooRE, FEaRA. PRAacicE §23.02(1) (2d ed. 1969).
13. At least one jurisdiction, Oregon, continues to restrict class actions to suits in equity.
See American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 500 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Ore. 1972).
14. Starts, The Consumer Class Action -Part II: Considerationsof Procedure,49 B.U.L.
Rav. 407, 427 (1969).
15. Illinois, Massachsetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Virginia, Vermont. Cf. id.
16. "When the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when
the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." Blume, The "Common
Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mim. L. Rav. 878

(1932).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/4

2

Knight: Consumer Class Actions: A Proposal For[Vol.
Florida
xxw

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

utes enacted throughout the United States, including old Federal Equity Rule
38, adopted in 1912.17
The history of class actions in the United States is marked by the instrumental role such actions have played in the development of important legal
issues. For example, the United States Supreme Court's 1954 landmark school
desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education,8 was a class action
brought by a few black students and parents on behalf of all black public
school children in Topeka, Kansas. More recently, class actions have been
utilized in cases challenging public school financing, 19 welfare laws, 20 and
private business projects potentially harmful to the environment. 2' Similarly,
the class action has become increasingly popular with consumer advocates as a
22
procedural vehicle for combatting consumer fraud.
Policy Development
All class action rules and statutes impose the same basic "numerous parties"
and "common interest" requirements. 2 Judicial treatment of the class action,
however, has varied widely, 24 and recent support for consumer class actions has
sharpened jurisdictional distinctions.
The benefits of class actions include distribution of the costs of litigation
among class members, avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, and a general
economization of judicial resources.2 5 Additionally, consumer class actions are
claimed to produce a beneficial psychological effect by channeling the efforts
of numerous outraged consumers against a common foe without intervention
26
of an administrative agency and within the existing judicial structure.
Virginia Knauer, special assistant to the President for consumer affairs, has
termed consumer fraud an "economic cancer. "27 The consumer class action
could help arrest this "cancer" by affording average consumers a viable

17. See id. at 878-80 for history of the Field Code.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The class action was also used by Tennessee voters in the reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the Supreme Court
enunciated the "one person, one vote" doctrine.
19. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 118 NJ. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Young v. Shuart, 67 Misc. 2d 689, 325 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
21. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem.
Corp., 272 So. 2d 542 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (unsuccessful class action on behalf of riparians
and users of a waterway for damages resulting from defendant's pollution).
22. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971); Georgia Inv. Co. v. Norman, 229 Ga. 160, 190 S.E.2d 48 (1972); Lusky v. Capasso
Bros., 118 N.J. Super. 369, 287 A.2d 7386 (1972).
23. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
24. See text accompanying notes 132-141 infra.
25. See Berger, Class Actions, 77 CASE & CoM. 26 (1972). See also Miami v. Keton, 115
So. 2d 547, 552 (Fla. 1959) (successful class action to recover traffic fines).
26. See Starrs, supra note 14, at 408-15.
27. Hearings on Consumer Protection Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate
Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 48, pt. 1, at 15 (1970).
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remedy. For this reason, the consumer class action has been viewed as a form
of "judicial populism."28
On the negative side, opponents of consumer class actions have raised three
general objections to liberalizing class action rules: (1) consumer class actions
will present overwhelming manageability problems for the courts, (2) a flood
of litigation will ensue, and (3) harassment suits against businessmen will
increase.
Manageability. In determining whether a consumer class action will be
too burdensome procedurally, courts are primarily concerned with problems
of notice to absent class members and distribution of the recovery awarded to
the class.
For the typical federal class action, 29 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c) (2) requires the "best notice practicable under the circumstances" to
absent class members, "including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort." This notice provision comports with
minimum due process requirements: actual notice to class members whose
location is known or easily obtainable; and notice by publication to the remainder.3 0
The major logistics problem involved in providing notice to absent class
members is the potentially prohibitive cost. Postage expense required to mail
personal notice to several thousand identifiable class members may alone dis-

courage the class representative. Some courts, acknowledging the inequities
inherent in this situation, have permitted notice to be mailed on the federal
franking privilegea3 or have required the defendant to share the costs of
notice in certain circumstances. 32 Nevertheless, most courts that have considered the issue place at least the initial costs of notice upon the class representative.3 3 If he is financially unable to comply, dismissal of the suit usually
results.34 Consequently, under this traditional approach, it is necessarily more
expensive to sue a supplier who has defrauded thousands of consumers than a
supplier who has defrauded only a few.
The practical ramifications of the traditional approach are well illustrated

28. Schrag & Meltsner, supra note 5, at 55.
29. Most federal class actions are brought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), which
requires that common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only
individual class members.
30. Schroeder v. City of New York, 871 U.S. 208, 218 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
81. See, e.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.
1969), af'd on other grounds,423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
82. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
3. See, e.g., Buford v. American Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See
generally Harte & Forde, PracticalProblems in Handling Class -Actions, 15 TRAL LAWYE'S
GUmE 549 (1971).
34. Harte & Forde, supra note 3. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
1015 (2d Cir. 1978).
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by the latest pronouncement of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
3
Second Circuit, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
5 a much-litigated class action
brought under Federal Rule 23 on behalf of odd-lot investors against stock
brokerage firms for violation of the Sherman Act. The members of the class
numbered six million and the potential recovery was $60 million. The district
court, in an effort to make the action manageable, had prescribed personal
notice to approximately 2,000 class members who had odd-lot transactions
during a certain period and to 5,000 other class members selected at random
from two million identifiable odd-lot investors, with notice by publication to
the remainder. 36 After a preliminary hearing on the merits of the case, the
district court ordered the defendant to pay ninety per cent of the estimated
11,000 dollar notice expense. 7 Reversing the order,38 the circuit court de4°
39
termined that the action was unmanageable, stating:
If identification of any number of members of the class can readily be
made, individual notice to [identifiable] members must be given and
[plaintiff] must pay the cost. If this cannot be done, the case must be
dismissed as a class action. [Moreover, since] the class membership was
of such diversity and was so dispersed that no notice by publication
could be devised by the ingenuity of man that could reasonably be
expected to notify more than a relatively small proportion of the class,
a ruling should have been made forthwith dismissing the case as a
class action.
The obvious lesson of Eisen for suppliers is that fraudulent schemes, if
practiced, should be perpetrated on as many consumers as possible. This increases the likelihood that a court will find a class action arising from the
scheme unmanageable, virtually assuring the supplier immunity from any
private consumer remedy. 41 Recognizing this anomalous situation, the Eisen
court suggested that "some means should be provided by law for the redress
of these wrongs to the community and to society as a whole." 42 The court,
however, did not elaborate on what form the "means" should take.
Another facet of the manageability dilemma, also treated in Eisen, is the
distribution of plaintiffs' recovery. If the identification of persons entitled to

35. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), reveg 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. 52 F.R.D. 253, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
37. 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1015. The Second Circuit, voting 6-3, denied petition for an en banc rehearing. Id. at 1020. Judge Kaufman's opinion, with which four other judges concurred, stated
he voted against rehearing "not because I believe this case is unimportant, but because
the case is of such extraordinary consequence that I am confident the Supreme Court will
take this matter under its certiorari jurisdiction."
41. The average individual claim of $3.90 in Eisen would not have made it worthwhile
to bring an individual action. Id. at 1010.
42.

Id. at 1019.
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recover appears too difficult, most courts will usually dismiss the action.43
Nevertheless, some innovative methods 44 have been developed in this area to
allow the plaintiff to continue his suit. One such approach is the "fluid recovery doctrine," providing that if refunds to all class members are not feasible then the excess recovery should be used to benefit the class as a whole 4 5
An early application of this doctrine was in Market Street Railway v. Railroad
Commission- where a trolley company was found to have collected illegally
$700,000 in excess fares. After refunding $12,000 to identifiable customers, the
California supreme court ordered the balance applied toward improvement of
trolley service generally.47 In a more recent decision, the so-called Drug Cases,4 8
the Illinois attorney general, on behalf of Illinois consumers, recovered $4.5
million in an antitrust conspiracy action against drug manufacturers. The
attorney general announced that a substantial portion of the damages would
be used to finance future public health projects in Illinois. 49 As these decisions
demonstrate, the possibility that all class members may not be identified or
that the entire recovery may not be distributed does not automatically bar
relief, especially when the only alternative is to allow the defendant to retain
the fruits of his wrongdoing.
In contrast, the Eisen court rejected the fluid recovery doctrine as a solution
to manageability problems, finding no provision for such a procedure "within
the four corners of amended Rule 23."50 Furthermore, "[e]ven if amended
Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any such fantastic procedure, the courts
would have to reject it as an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of
due process of law."' 1 Contrary California decisions 52 were distinguished as
"arising under a state class action statute very different in its phraseology from
amended Rule 23,"53 and the contrary federal court ruling in the Drug Cases
was distinguished as involving a settlement fund, created without objection.r
The court did not enumerate the practical or constitutional differences faced
43. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72-73 (D.N.J. 1971). See
generally Comment, Manageability of Notice and Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70

MicH.L. Rv. 338 (1971).
44. One approach is to return the excess recovery to the defendant. See IND. ANN. STAT.
§19-15-104(b) (Supp. 1972).
45. See generally Grossman, Class Actions, Manageability and the Fluid Recovery
Doctrine,47 Los ANGELES B. BuLL 415 (1972).
46. 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946).
47. Id. at 372-73, 171 P.2d at 881.
48. Cotler Drugs v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US.
871 (1971).
49.

1

CCH CONSUmEPM

162 (1971).

50. 479 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Id. at 1018.
52. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
53. Id. at 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 1018. The federal district court in the Drug Cases approved a $100 million
settlement among the five drug companies, defendants, and plaintiffs' class, consisting of

state and local governments, wholesalers, retailers, and individual consumers. 314 F. Supp.
710 (1970). An unsuccessful appeal was taken by wholesalers and retailers dissatisfied with
their share of the recovery. 440 F.2d 1079 (1971).
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by a federal and state court in this situation, nor by a court administering a
fund created by settlement of a fund created by litigation. Certainly, calculation and distribution of the final recovery in Eisen would have been difficult,
but the possible alternative of permitting the defendants to retain illegally
acquired funds should have been equally repugnant to the court.
Flood of Litigation. The opponents of consumer class actions argue that
relaxation of class action standards will result in a flood of litigation and increased burdens on the courts.5 5 Although some proponents contend that
courts will not become overburdened,56 there is evidence that the relatively
liberal 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 23 has caused increased litigation in
federal courts. 5 7 This increase has generated a degree of federal "judicial backlash" against class actions 5s Indeed, the Eisen court displayed such a reaction
when it observed that "[c]lass actions have sprouted and multiplied like the
leaves of the green bay tree."5 9 Whether federal courts are "overburdened"
because of this multiplicity, however, is not clear.6 0 In any case, the solution
to increased litigation should not be the denial of remedies, but rather the
expansion of facilities.61 Moreover, there is positive evidence that the enactment of consumer class action legislation in some jurisdictions has neither
2
resulted in the filing of frivolous claims nor in greater judicial burdens.6
Harassment Suits. A related complaint of consumer class action critics is
that relaxation of class action requirements will generate an increase in harassment, or "strike" suits against businessmen. 63 Professor Milton Handier, author
of the Annual Antitrust Review, has termed consumer class actions "legitimization of legal blackmail," 64 a characterization with which the Eisen court

55. See McGough & Lerach, Termination of Class Actions: The Judicial Role, 33 U. PIrr.
L. REv. 445 (1972).
56. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: CONSUMER PROPOSALS FOR
CLASS AcrIONS AND OTHER REMEDIES 13 (1970).
57. "Of the 101,032 civil cases pending in federal district courts on June 30, 1972, a
total of 3,148 - or 3 out of 100- were classified by the Administrative Office of the United
States courts as 'class action litigation."'
58. E.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 675 (3d Cir. 1972); Shields v. First
Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972); Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
59. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
60. The federal courts may have experienced greater litigation if many of the class
actions brought under rule 23 were "broken down" into individual suits.
61. See Report of the Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, Hearings on Consumer Class
Actions Before the Subcomm. on Consumers of the Senate Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., Ist
Sess., ser. 20, at 70-80 (1971).
62. Few cases have been brought under state consumer class action statutes. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
63. See, e.g., Hall v. Coburn, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 403, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281,
285 (1970).
64. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits The 23rd Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 9 (1971).
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agreed.65 Proponents, however, have suggested several means to eliminate this
"strike" suit threat, including the following: requirement of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether a substantial possibility exists that the plaintiff
will prevail on the merits, 66 the limitation of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to
discourage those who might instigate litigation in hopes of receiving a substantial percentage of a large class recovery,67 and the payment of defendants'
legal fees by a plaintiff who maintains a frivolous claim. 68 Proper use of these
and similar procedures by the courts can effectively prevent frivolous or
harassing actions. Given an overly restrictive judicial attitude, however, these
measures could also seriously hamper the utility of the class action, transforming the device into a toothless remedy.
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE

Originally enacted as a statute, 69 Florida's class action rule states:70
When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole.
The rule, on its face, is different in two respects from the original New
York Field Code amendment of 1849.71 First, the Florida rule was enacted as
a separate rule and not as part of a multiple party and joinder provision. 72
Second, the wording of the Florida rule creates only one category of persons
who may bring class actions, whereas the Field Code arguably creates two.73
Early Florida class suits, brought pursuant to section 14 of the 1931
Chancery Act,7 4 a precursor of the present class action rule, generally involved
two situations:75 (1) the "true" class suit, in which a joint right or obligation
existed; or (2) the "common-question76 class suit in which the rights of the
parties were several, but a common question of law or fact predominated.
65. 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1978).
66. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The Eisen court
rejected this "mini-hearing" approach, finding no provision for it in rule 23. 479 F.2d 1005,
1015 (2d Cir. 1973).
67. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §19-15-104(b) (Supp. 1972).
68.

See AMERICAN ENTmwPsE INsTrTUTE, supra note 56, at 17.

69. Law of June 4, 1931, ch. 14,658, §14 (1931) Gen. Acts of Fla. 58. See Note, Class
Suits, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 75 (1956). The statute was patterned after old Federal Equity Rule

38.
70. FLA. R. Cnv. P. 1.220.
71. See Blume, supra note 16.
72. See Staars, supra note 14, at 436.

73. Nevertheless, courts generally construe the Field Code as creating only one category:
those persons having a common or general interest but who are too numerous to join in a
single action. See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. Rv.
609, 614 (1971).
74. Law of June 4, 1931, ch. 14,658, §14 (1931) Gen. Acts of Fla. 58.

75. See Note, supra note 69, at 76-78.
76. Of course, "true" class actions involve a common question. But in order to avoid the
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The "true" class suit is exemplified by Meier v. Johnston7 7 in which representatives of an unincorporated union were allowed to bring foreclosure
proceedings on behalf of all union members as co-holders of the mortgage.
Since the class members possessed a joint right in the mortgaged property and
were too numerous to be joined individually in the action, the court de78
termined that the basic class action requirements had been satisfied.
A "true" consumer class action likewise requires the existence of numerous
persons having a joint property right. Such a case would arise if several consumers made a joint purchase of one or more items from a fraudulent supplier.
Each consumer would thus possess an interest in the common property. An
action for damages in this rare situation would presumably be maintainable
in Florida.

Most class actions, however, arise in the second situation, in which a common question of law or fact, but no joint right or obligation, is present. For
example, in Allen v. Avondale7 9 a purchaser of a lot in a subdivision was
allowed to bring suit on behalf of all lot owners to remove restrictive covenants
from their deeds. The plaintiff alleged changed circumstances materially affecting use of the land. The court ruled that "the question raised [was] one
common to many owners of a similar class who [were] so numerous that it
would be futile to bring them all before the court."' s ° Similarly, in Tenney v.
Miami Beach 81 a class suit was maintained successfully by representatives of
over 200 property owners seeking to cancel allegedly invalid tax liens imposed
on their lands and to restore funds already collected. The Florida supreme
court held that to have required over 200 separate actions "would have been
prohibitive and ridiculous,"8 2 and expressed its policy considerations in allowing the class suit: "The very purpose of a class suit is to save a multiplicity of
suits, to reduce the expense of litigation, to make legal processes more effective
and expeditious, and to make available a remedy that would not otherwise
exist."8 3
Similarly, the typical consumer class action involves a question of law or
fact common to all class members, but no joint right or obligation. For ex-

connotations applied to "spurious" class actions, as that term was used in relation to old
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, "common question" is used here to define those class
actions in which the only binding interest is a common question of law or fact. Additionally,
there was a third type of class action under old Federal Rule 23. This type, the so-called
"hybrid" class action, involved litigation by the class of several rights related to specific
property. See note 117 infra. The only reported Florida case that resembles this "hybrid"
situation is Mainor v. Hobbie, 218 So. 2d 203 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969), in which subdivision
property owners were allowed to bring a class action to enjoin other subdivision property
owners from obstructing access to a nearby bay in violation of the subdivision plan.
77. 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1933).
78. Id. at 376, 149 So. at 185.
79. 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
80. Id. at 9, 185 So. at 138.
81. 152 Fla. 126, 11 So. 2d 188 (1942).
82. Id. at 129, 11 So. 2d at 189.
83. Id.
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ample, a common question of law and fact will be created whenever a supplier
utilizes the same fraudulent technique to induce many consumers to enter into
separate, otherwise unrelated transactions. Although the language of Tenney
suggests that a consumer class action brought in this instance would be favored
by Florida courts, nevertheless, such has not been the case.
In 1947 Florida courts began to develop a more restrictive view of the class
action. This development has been reflected in a stringent application of
formal class action requirements, and has been underscored by a shift in
judicial policy from stressing the potential benefits of class actions to emphasizing their supposed detriments.
The first indication of this policy change occurred in Lakeland v. Chase
National Co.,8 ' in which the Florida supreme court dismissed a class suit
brought by representative landowners seeking to revoke tax foreclosure sales
of their lands on the ground of inadequate notice. Although the court cited
lack of numerous persons as a basis for its holding,85 the primary judicial concern appeared to be the potential for injustice to absent class members, since
under the Florida rule all class members would necessarily have been included
in any judgment in the action.8 6 According to the opinion "[t]he provision for
class suits is not a rule of law to be blindly followed without regard to the
companion principle of law that no one can be bound by a judgment affecting
his property without his day in court."87 The positive aspects of class suits
were not discussed.
Later Florida decisions have also been characterized by an emphasis on the
negative aspects of class actions, including the possibility of inadequate representation by the class representative"" and the difficulty of ascertaining the
extent of the class.89 In a 1969 case, Brown v. Ellingson,90 a representative
owner of lakefront property sought to enjoin neighboring orchardists from
drawing water from the lake without the landowners' consent. Dismissing the
action, the court held the plaintiff had failed to allege existence of the class
with "the degree of certainty required,"91. or to show that he adequately rep-

84. 159 Na. 783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947).
85. Id. at 792, 32 So. 2d at 838.
86. There is no provision in the current Florida class action rule for exclusion of
absent class members from the judgment. Therefore, under prevailing authority, absent class
members are necessarily bound by the decree. Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126,
129, 11 So. 2d 188, 190 (1942); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46, 48 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
87. 159 Fla. at 791, 32 So. 2d at 838.
88. See, e.g., Ross v. Gerung, 69 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1954) (successful action against
class of church members to establish an equitable lien on church property).
89. Peter v. Meeks, 163 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1964) (unsuccessful class action challenging
method of ad valorem tax assessment); Metropolitan Dade County v. Maddox, 242 So. 2d 165
(3d D.CA. Fla. 1970) (unsuccessful class action for an accounting of all monies allegedly due
county employees for overtime accrued); Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Samartino, 213 So. 2d
627 (3d D.C.A. Fa. 1968) (unsuccessful class action to compel telephone company to list
doctors' specialties in telephone directory).
90. 224 So. 2d 391 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
91. Id. at 395.
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resented the absent class members. 92 Again, the benefits of class actions, including the distribution of costs among class members, were not treated.
The outcome in Brown was largely a result of the plaintiff's failure to draft
his pleadings with the particularity required by the controlling Florida supreme court decision, Port Royal, Inc. v. Conboy. 93 There, a class suit brought
by ad valorem taxpayers challenged municipal valuation of developed land.
The court, in allowing the action, determined that the prospective class representative had properly alleged: 94 (1) the existence of an identifiable class, described with certainty, (2) the necessity for bringing the action as a class suit,
(3)the plaintiff's right and ability to represent the class adequately, (4) the impracticability of bringing the numerous class members before the court, and
(5) the existence of a common interest binding the class. Furthermore, it
stated the plaintiff's interest must be "coextensive" with the interest of the
other members of the class with a common right of recovery based on the
same essential facts, 95 and such "common or general interest must be in the
object of the action, in the result sought to be accomplished in the proceedings,
or in the question involved in the action." 96 This definition of "common
interest," although lacking concrete illustration, could include the "true" class
action and the "common question" class action, both of which have been
9
maintained successfully in Florida. 7
Even if the precise pleading requirements of Port Royal are satisfied, however, the potential Florida plaintiff in a consumer class action must overcome
another major obstacle, the 1955 precedent of Osceola Groves v. Wiley.98
There, representative lot owners sought an injunction and an accounting
against a developer who had allegedly violated similar covenants in all the
class members' deeds. Denying the class suit, the court reiterated the fear expressed in Lakeland v. Chase National Co.9 9 that property rights of absent
class members might be prejudiced in their absence, 100 and stated: 101
[N]either under existing codes nor under general rules of law is a representative action upheld to recover damages for similar frauds practiced on numerous persons. In general, the objections to such suits are
the same as those applied to representative suits to rescind for fraud;
namely, that the demands of the various defrauded parties are not only
legally distinct, but each depends on its own facts, and a material difference in facts may exist. Furthermore, a choice of remedies is ordinarily

92. Id. at 394.
93. 154 So. 2d 734 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
94. Id. at 737.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959) ("common question"
class action); Ross v. Gerung, 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954) ("true" class action).
98. 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955).
99. 159 Fla. 783, 791, 32 So. 2d 833, 838 (1947).
100. 78 So. 2d at 701-02.
101. 78 So. 2d at 702, quoting from Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015, 1019 (1938).
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presented, and the plaintiff cannot know that other persons similarly
situated will not elect to affirm the fraudulent transaction.
This language, termed anachronistic by the California supreme court" 2
has been parroted in recent Florida decisions. In Wilson v. First National
Bank of Miami Springs,03 for example, a representative of used car dealers

sought to recover automobile auction proceeds deposited by the auctioneer in
defendant bank. Citing Osceola Groves in affirming dismissal of the action,10 '
the appellate court stated "each appellant is suing on his own check or checks
and has no pecuniary interest in any other check which may be held by another appellant or person ....

The interest of each appellant is completely

independent of the interest of the other named appellants and is independent
of the other alleged members of the class."'1 5 Similarly, in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Pasco0 6 a Florida appellate court dismissed a class action

for damages brought by department store customers alleging illegal computation of finance charges on credit accounts. The court held that, since the class
members were offered separate and individual credit contracts by the defendant stores, Osceola Groves required denial of plaintiffs' class action
status.

07

Neither the Wilson nor the Pasco courts expressed any consideration

for the possibility that the only feasible judicial remedy of the class may have
been precluded.
The impact of these decisions on future consumer class actions in Florida
is obvious. The typical class action for consumer fraud, like the class action in
Pasco, is based on a common question of law or fact arising from similar
frauds practiced on numerous persons. Such a class action, applying the
Osceola Groves rationale, would presumably be summarily dismissed. As a
result, the private consumer class action has been effectively eliminated as a
viable weapon against consumer fraud in this state. 08
This consequence is particularly deplorable, since it is questionable
whether the Osceola Groves decision deserves judicial adherence. As indicated
previously,0 9 pre-1947 Florida cases liberally interpreted the state class action
statute. The restrictive holdings since that time, including Osceola Groves,
constitute an inexplicable break with earlier Florida precedent."10 Moreover,

102. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 820 n.17, 484 P.2d 964, 977 n.17, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 809 n.17.
103. 254 So. 2d 362 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
104. Id. at 363.
105. Id.
106. 275 So. 2d 46 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1973).
107. Id. at 48. See also Watnick v. Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., 275 So. 2d 278 (3d
D.CA. Fla. 1973) (unsuccessful class action on behalf of Bankamericard credit card holders
challenging method of calculating finance charges).
108. For a consideration of the possibility of public class actions on behalf of defrauded
consumers, see text accompanying notes 151-155 infra.
109. See text accompanying notes 75-83 supra.
110. Plaintiff's attorney in Daniels v. National Brands Tire Co., 270 So. 2d 448, 449 (3d
D.CA. Fla. 1972), argued: "The later rulings of the Osceola Groves case and the Wilson
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in Osceola Groves real property rights were at issue. 11 Because of the exalted
position that real property occupies in the common law tradition and in the
Florida economy, the extension of the Osceola Groves rule to all cases in
which similar frauds have been perpetrated on numerous persons seems an
extreme and unjustified process. 112 It therefore seems more reasonable, and
equitable, to limit Osceola Groves to its facts. Finally, the fear expressed in
Lakeland v. Chase National Co."' s and Osceola Groves'1 4 that absent class
members would be denied their "day in court" is largely invalid today, since
class action rules have been amended in many jurisdictions to allow for the
exclusion of class members from the judgment. 1 5 Nevertheless, the Florida
rule remains unchanged, and Florida courts continue to follow Osceola Groves
in diverse fact situations, giving little consideration to the factual setting of
that decision. While other jurisdictions have been expanding or altering their
class action rules"1 6 Florida has demonstrated no perceptible movement in
the development of this valuable procedural device.
THE ExPERIENCE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Federal
In 1966 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to alleviate the
confusion that resulted from attempts by the federal courts to categorize
particular class actions according to the three classifications established by the
rule."1 Amended rule 23 imposes five general requirements for maintaining
class actions in federal courts: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder
of all members would be impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law
and fact common to all members of the class; (3) the claims and defenses must

case indicate a stricture of the Court's view concerning applicability of class action, with no
clear explanation of its view concerning class action propriety at later times." The court rejected this argument and dismissed the class action on the basis of Osceola Groves.
111. See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
112. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank, 254 So. 2d 362 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1971) (where
rule of Osceola Groves was adopted in case involving alleged conversion of a bank deposit).
113. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
115. See, e.g., Fr. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)-(3). Thirteen states have class action rules patterned
after new rule 23. Cf. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action -Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 433 (1969). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §1781(e)(2) (West 1970).
Under the current Florida rule absent class members are necessarily included in the judgment. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 117-118, 132-137, 142-149 infra.
117. Old rule 23 established three types of class actions, commonly referred to as: (1)
"true" class actions, litigation of joint, common, or secondary rights; (2) "hybrid" class
actions, litigation by the class of several rights related to specific property; and (3) "spurious"
class actions, litigation by the class of a common question of law or fact. Most class actions,
including consumer class actions, were brought under the "spurious" category. See Deans,
supra note 8, at 10. See generally 3b J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f23.01(8) (2d ed. 1969).
Nineteen states still follow rules based on old Federal Rule 23. Cf. Starts, supra note 115, at
469.
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be typical of those of the class; (4) the representative plaintiff must be able to
protect fairly and adequately the interests of the entire class; and (5) the class
action must be superior to other available methods for the fair and effident
adjudication of the controversy. 8s
Amended rule 23 has been given a liberal interpretation by most courts.' 9
Nevertheless, in Snyder v. Harris2" the United States Supreme Court substantially nullified rule 23 as a basis for maintaining a consumer class action
in diversity cases. Snyder involved two actions consolidated upon appeal, the
first of which charged that board members of a corporation in which the class
members owned stock had sold their personal shares far in excess of the fair
market value, and had not distributed the excess among all shareholders as
required by state law. Although the total claim of all shareholders was approximately $1.2 million, plaintiff's individual claim was only $8,740. Similarly, the second action involved a total claim exceeding $10,000 and an in21
dividual plaintiff's claim of $7.81. Dismissing both cases the Court ruled
that the claims of individual class members were separate and distinct and
therefore could not be aggregated to satisfy the $10,000 amount in controversy
requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction. 22 Since the typical consumer
class action also involves separate and distinct claims that are considerably less
than $10,000,23 it would be barred in federal courts under the Snyder rationale if brought pursuant to rule 23 and based on federal diversity jurisdiction.

24

In response to Snyder, several proposals for federal consumer class action
legislation were introduced in Congress. 125 The first proposal, 26 made in 1969
118. See generally Young, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action
Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 631 (1970). Federal class action requirements

are similar to those set out in Port Royal, Inc. v. Conboy, 154 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1963). Judicial
interpretation and application of the criteria has varied, however, with Florida courts taking

a more restrictive view than federal courts. See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
119. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968). See also
Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Center, 61 N.J. 218, 294 A.2d 7 (1972); Brown v. Brown, 6 Wash.

App. 249, 492 P.2d 581 (1971), for interpretation of state rules patterned after new Federal
Rule 23. However, there seems to be a current anti-class action trend in federal courts. See
text accompanying note 58 supra.
120. 894 U.S. 332 (1969).
121. Id. at 338.
122. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1971).

123. Most disputes between merchants and individual consumers involve less than $300.
Deans, supra note 8, at 4. Aggregation for jurisdictional purposes would be allowed in "true"
class actions, in which a joint right or obligation exists, and in anti-trust conspiracy actions.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1973), for antitrust conspiracy action. See also Comment, Class Actions -Aggregation Aggravation, 24 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 173 (1969).
124. The United States Supreme Court will have a chance to review the Snyder decision
in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert granted, 410 U.S. 925
(1973).
125. See generally Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NoTRa DAME LAw. 663, 668-77
(1970); Leete, The Right of Consumers To Bring Class Actions in the Federal Courts-An
Analysis of PossibleApproaches, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 39 (1971).
126. S. 8092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1969). This bill was reintroduced in expanded
form in the 92d Congress by Senator Bayh. S. 1378, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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by former Senator Tydings, would permit a consumer to bring a class action
for damages under rule 23 in cases of deceptive trade practice prohibited by
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 12 7 or by state law. Contrary to

Snyder this proposal would allow aggregation of individual claims provided
the total aggregate amount equaled at least $25,000. President Nixon also
recommended legislation in 1969 providing for a consumer class action for
damages resulting from certain deceptive trade practices, but only after the
United States Attorney General has obtained or the Federal Trade Commission has issued a final cease and desist order.128 Finally, in 1970 the Senate
Commerce Committee reported a compromise bill that would give the consumer the alternative of: (1) suing in a class action on the basis of a final
determination of an unfair trade practice as provided in the administration
bill; or (2) suing without waiting for a final determination provided the
consumer gives ninety days notice to the Federal Trade Commission before
129
bringing the action, and the consumer's individual claim exceeds ten dollars.
The original Tydings bill appears to be the most consumer oriented of the
proposals, since the consumer must await neither governmental action, as required by the administration bill's "trigger" provision, nor official acquiescence, as provided in the committee proposal.1 30 Nevertheless, due primarily
to the intense opposition of American industry13 , none of these bills have
been enacted. This fact, coupled with Snyder's impact on the availability to
consumers of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, has made it imperative that
steps be taken on the state level to establish the right of consumers to bring
class actions in cases of consumer fraud.
States
Utilization of the class action device as a weapon against consumer fraud
has varied widely among the states, with California probably the most advanced jurisdiction in permitting consumer class actions. In Vasquez v. Superior Court'3 2 the California supreme court permitted a class action in a

127. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is a broad prohibition of deceptive
and unfair trade practices. The Act leaves to the Federal Trade Commission the task of
promulgating rules applying to specific acts. 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (1971).
128. S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §204 (1969). Reintroduced as S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. §6 (1971).
129. S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §102 (1971). The Tydings bill also requires a $10
minimum individual claim.
130. One possible objection to the Tydings bill is that its $25,000 aggregate jurisdictional amount requirement is too high, especially because most states presently afford no
feasible alternative remedy. The Committee's bill's sole requirement of a $10 individual
claim seems more reasonable.
131.

See, e.g., Testimony of the Southern States Industrial Council, Hearings on Con-

sumer Class Actions Before the Subcomm. on Consumers of the Senate Commerce Comm.,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 20, 243-45 (1971). See generally Schrag & Meltsner, supra note 5, at
57.
132. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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consumer fraud case for the first time. 1'3 The action was instituted on behalf
of 200 purchasers of freezers and food, seeking rescission of their purchase
agreements on the ground that the costs under the agreements had been
illegally inflated. Overturning the lower court's dismissal, the court relied on
California's development of the class action, 34 federal decisions allowing class
actions in securities fraud cases, 135 and a strong public policy in favor of preventing fraud generally. 136 Specifically, it held that consumer class actions for
fraud should not be dismissed when the pleadings alleged existence of a sys137
tematic pattern of misrepresentation.
California's innovative approach to consumer class actions, however, is
unrepresentative of most states. In Hall v. Coburn,"3s for example, the New
York court of appeals upheld the dismissal of a consumer class action brought
to recover damages for the defendants' alleged violation of New York's Retail
Installment Act. The defendant had used the same allegedly illegal installment
contract form with each class member and had assigned all contracts to the
same finance company. The court determined that "more of a common interest [was required] than the fact that a number of persons made a number
of quite different and unrelated contracts with a number of different and unrelated sellers using the same written form which is claimed illegal.""39 The

main concern of the New York court seemed to be that class actions might
prejudice the rights of absent class members and "become instruments of
' 4
harassment benefiting largely the persons who activate the litigation.
41
Many jurisdictions, including Florida, have echoed these same fears.'
In partial response to widespread conservative judicial reaction to the class
action, consumer advocates have turned increasingly to state legislatures for
relief. The result has been the enactment of consumer class action legislation
in several jurisdictions. 42 The California "Consumer Legal Remedies Act,"'' 3

See Note, judicial Protection for the Consumer:. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 23
.J.
513 (1972).
134. 4 Cal. 3d at 808, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
135. Id. at 815, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
136. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
137. Id. at 805, 484 P.2d at 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798. See also Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. (1972); La Sala v. American Say.
g-Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). The misrepresentations
in Vasquez had been made by the defendant's salesmen in a memorized standard sales pitch
to the class members.
138. 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
139. Id. at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
140. Id. at 404, 259 N.E2.d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 286. See also Gaynor v. Rockefeller,
15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965); Fisher v. Health Ins. Plan, 67 Misc.
2d 674, 324 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Summers v. Wyman, 64 Misc. 2d 67, 314 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1970).
141. See text accompanying notes 85-108 supra. See also Caswell v. Reserve Natl Ins. Co.,
234 So. 2d 250 (4th Ct. App. La. 1970); Freeman v. State-Wide Carpet Distrib., 365 Mich. 313,
112 N.W.2d 439 (1961); Barrett v. Coullet, 263 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1972).
142. ALAsKA STAT. §45.50.531 (Supp. 1972); CAL. Civ. CoDE §1781 (West 1973); IND. STAr.
ANN. §19-15-104(b) (Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93A, §9(2) (Supp. 1971); P.R. LAws
133.

HASTINGS
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the most detailed of such legislation, was enacted while the case of Vasquez v.
Superior Court 44 was pending. Patterned after the federal class action rule,
the law permits consumers to bring class actions for damages or equitable relief in cases of deceptive trade practices prohibited under another section of
the act. 145 It also provides for a hearing to determine if an action is properly
maintainable as a class action and lists criteria for making this determination.146 Other subsections of the act deal with notice to absent class members;
exclusion of class members upon request; and voluntary dismissal, settlement,
and compromise of the class action. Corresponding legislation in other jurisdictions includes additional "safeguard provisions" requiring approval of the
state attorney general before filing suit, 147 the posting of bond by the plain.
tiff,148 and the limitation of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.1 49

The enactment of state consumer class action legislation has been the most
encouraging recent development in the area of consumer remedies. Such laws
establish the statutory right of consumers to bring class actions, thereby diminishing the almost exclusive control previously exercised over this remedy
by a generally conservative judiciary. The practical impact of such legislation
in California and other jurisdictions is yet to be realized, since few cases have
been decided under any of the acts. Potentially, however, such legislation can
become an important weapon against consumer fraud, provided consumers
are willing to utilize their new rights and courts are willing to give full effect
to the spirit of the legislation.
A

PROPOSAL FOR FLORIDA

In Florida, as in other jurisdictions, consumer advocates have turned to the
legislature for relief, with some success. 50 For example, the 1973 Florida Legislature enacted the "Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,"' 15 which

ANN. tit. 32, §3341 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §6-13.1-5.2 (Supp. 1972). Other legislatures have empowered state attorneys general to secure restitution for a defrauded class
of consumers. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); OHO REv.
CODE ANN. §§1345.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:8-14 (Supp. 1973). For a

case brought under the New Jersey statute, see Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A2d 640
(1971). Florida has recently enacted a statute authorizing the attorney general to secure
restitution for defrauded consumers. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 124, §§1-5, to be codified as FLA.
STAT. §§501.201-.213 (1973). See text accompanying notes 152-156 infra.

143.
144.
132-137
145.
146.

CAL. Civ. CODE §§1750-70, 1780-84 (West 1973).
4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). See text accompanying notes
supra.
CAL. CIV. CODE §1781 (West 1973).
These criteria are similar to the requirements for maintaining a class action under

Federal Rule 23. See text accompanying note 118 supra.

147. ALASKA STAT. §45.50.531 (Supp. 1972).
148. Id.
149. IND. STAT. ANN. §19-15-104(b) (Supp. 1972).
150. The Governor's Consumer Advisor proposed enactment of a consumer class action
statute in 1 CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 328.
151. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 124, §§1-5, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§501.201-.213 (1973).
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includes a provision empowering a state attorney to recover damages on behalf of individual consumers. 152 The provision is, however, subject to two
important limitations: (1) no damages are recoverable against a retailer who
has, in good faith, disseminated unlawful claims of a manufacturer or wholesaler without actual knowledge that such dissemination was prohibited by the
act; 153 and (2) before filing suit, a state attorney must hold an administrative

hearing to determine if probable cause exists to bring the action. 154 The first
limitation, if enforced by the courts, 55 would allow an unjustly enriched retailer to retain the fruits of objectionable conduct in certain circumstances.
Furthermore, the second limitation adds to the typical bureaucratic entanglements already confronting defrauded consumers who seek relief through governmental intervention. Thus, if a state attorney cannot bring a public class
action because of financial or manpower restrictions, or will not bring such
an action because of lobbying pressures or policy determinations, most fraudulent suppliers in Florida will escape financial threat from any administrative
or judicial source.1 56
This "loophole" in consumer redress can be closed by enactment of consumer class action legislation in Florida, establishing the right of consumers
to bring private consumer class actions in state courts. Of course, those who
fear the potential financial effect of consumer class actions on businesses will
not be easily convinced. To allay the justified concerns of most class action
critics, however, the legislature could include proper "safeguard provisions"
in the act.1 57 Such an enactment could be accomplished by amending Florida's
"Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act"'15 to provide:

152. Id. §1, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §501.207(l)(c) (1973).
153. Id.
154. Id. §1, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §501.207(1)(d) (1973).
155. The committee attorney of the Florida House of Representatives' Committee on
Business Regulation questions whether a court will enforce this limitation. Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade PracticesAct, Sectional Summary (1973).
156. See generally Schrag & Meltsner, supra note 5; Note, Consumer Protection-Public
Class Actions-New Hope for Defrauded Consumers, 76 DicK. L. Rxv. 342 (1972). The
Florida law also authorizes an individual action for damages and allows the prevailing party
to recover attorney's fees (determined on an hourly fee basis) and court costs. Fla. Laws
1973, ch. 124, §, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§501.210(l), .211(2) (1973). This provision
appears to make private, individual actions economically feasible only in cases where a right
of recovery is almost a foregone conclusion. In most cases, however, recovery is uncertain,
and the consumer would have to weigh his claim against the possibility of losing the action
and becoming liable for the defendant's attorneys' fees, as well as his own. Rather than
being a deterrent to consumer fraud, such a procedure may hinder many individual consumer actions. On the other hand, when plaintiffs' recovery is virtually assured, a multiplidty of litigation could result creating an unnecessary burden on state courts as well as
on the losing defendant, who must pay all the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and court costs.
157. For examples of "safeguard provisions," see text accompanying notes 147-149 supra.
158. Enacting this proposal as legislation could present a problem, since §2, art. V of
the Florida constitution gives the Florida supreme court rulemaking power. The proposal
may come within the scope of that constitutional provision. If so, the proposal should be
directed to the court, seeking an amendment of the present class action rule.
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(1) that a person entitled to bring an individual action for damages
under section 501.211(2) may bring a class action for damages on behalf of
other consumers similarly situated; 159
(2) that a preliminary hearing be held in any class action to determine
if the criteria for maintaining a class action have been properly alleged in
order to guard the court and the defendant against a frivolous claim;
(3) that the court may direct either party to give notice to absent class
members and, if personal notice is unreasonably expensive or if all
class members cannot be identified, that notice by publication be authorized;
(4) that absent class members be bound by the judgment unless they
request exclusion, and that they be allowed to enter a personal appearance
in the action;
(5) that no dismissal, settlement, or compromise of the action be allowed
without court approval and notice to absent class members who are included in the judgment;
(6) that notice of the judgment be given to absent class members included in the judgment; and
(7) that any unclaimed damages be used to benefit the class generally. 160
Section (1) of the proposal empowers a consumer to bring a class action for
damages on behalf of other consumers injured by a deceptive trade practice.
Nowhere is this remedy provided by current Florida law. As a partial response
to consumer class action critics, a preliminary hearing provision to determine
if a class action is proper is included in section (2) to safeguard businessmen
from harassment suits and to protect the court from a flood of litigation. Another class action problem, notice expense, is dealt with by section (3), which
authorizes the court to order the defendant to share the costs of notice in a
legitimate class action. Such costs may be diminished by an allowance for
notice by publication. Section (4) is intended to counter the fear expressed by
the Florida supreme court in Lakeland v. Chase National Co.101 and Osceola
Groves v. Wiley,y 2 that class actions will deny absent class members their "day
in court." Under section (4), if absent class members request exclusion from
the judgment they will not be bound by it.163 Furthermore, those class members who have special claims or defenses may enter a personal appearance in
the case. Section (5) protects absent class members whenever the class representative seeks voluntarily to dismiss, settle, or compromise the action, and
section (6) requires notice of the judgment to absent class members in order
that they can make proper claim for their share of the recovery, if any. Finally,

159. Sections (1)-(6) of the proposal are patterned after California's "Consumer Legal
Remedies Act." CAL. CIV. CODE §1781 (West 1973).
160. Suggested provision: After a date specified in the notice of judgment, any damages
recovered by the plaintiff and not claimed by class members shall be used for the benefit
of the class generally. Such use shall be determined by the class representative(s) and approved by the court.
161. 159 Fla. 783, 792, 32 So. 2d 833, 838 (1947).
162. 78 So. 2d 700, 702-03 (Fla. 1955).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) also provides for exclusion of absent class members upon
request.
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the beneficial use of any damages remaining after the class members are
satisfied is authorized by section (7), an embodiment of the "fluid recovery
doctrine." 16 4
The proposal is a suggested working model that would afford Florida consumers a valuable remedy they do not now possess. It is not designed to solve
every controversial aspect of consumer class actions; additional "safeguard
provisions," for example, could be included. 65 If enacted, however, such legislation will aid greatly in completing the panoply of consumer protection now
provided by state law.
CONCLUSION

The class action can provide a viable remedy for consumers who cannot
find relief through governmental or private agencies. Moreover, consumer class
actions should help serve as an effective deterrent to consumer fraud once dishonest suppliers realize that unfair trade practices will lead to substantial
adverse judgments. As reflected in Osceola Groves v. Wiley, 66 however, a
restrictive view of the Florida class action rule has been taken by Florida
courts, making it extremely unlikely that a private consumer class action could
be successfully maintained in this state. Thus, the employer of unfair trade
practices in Florida is in large part immune from any real threat of having to
surrender the fruits of his wrongdoing.
One possible solution to this problem is the enactment of a state consumer
class action statute. Such a law could include proper provisions safeguarding
businessmen from harassing suits and enabling the courts to solve manageability problems while protecting against a flood of litigation. Most importantly, however, such legislation would establish a new avenue of consumer redress in Florida.
GERALD L. KNIGHT

164. See text accompanying notes 43-54 supra. The constitutionality of the "fluid recovery doctrine" was questioned in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir.
1973). Nevertheless, the doctrine had been implemented in other cases, and the issue of constitutionality had not been seriously raised. Furthermore, Eisen's treatment of the constitutional issue was dearly dictum. Therefore, the state legislature should not feel bound or
overly influenced by Eisen.

165. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a
consumer class action proposal that includes extensive "safeguard provisions." UNIFoRM
CoNsUUM SALEs PRACarIcs Aar §11

(1971). The Uniform State Laws Committee of the

Florida Bar has approved this proposed act and has submitted it to the Board of Governors.
47 FL. BAR J. 345 (1973). One commentator has termed the proposal an "air-tight mechanism to protect merchants from liability to a class for damages." Rice, Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act -Damage Remedies: The NCCUSL Giveth and Taketh Away, 67 Nw.
U.L. Rv. 369, 383 (1972).
166. 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955).
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